Helmut Walther (Nuremberg)

To Nietzsche's Philosophy

Nietzsche – Human and Super-Human

Man vergilt einem Lehrer schlecht, wenn man immer nur Schüler bleibt.
(One does not do justice to one's teacher by permanently remaining his pupil)

(Zarathustra I, Von der schenkenden Tugend 3)

It is not Christianity as Nietzsche perchance assumes that brought about a "negative re-evaluation" of all those wonderful ancient Greek values: why and how should it have done so? Christianity is, neither from its functionality an opposite factor to but rather a complementary factor of the ancient classical era, nor is true Christianity an opposing factor or force from the viewpoint of its inner existentiality, except perhaps to the (old testament) orthodox Jewish, un-lively formalism. Rather, even Christianity and its "success" is still a consequence of this reflection to which the ancient Greek era itself contributed quite substantially. Therefore also Nietzsche's attacks on Socrates and Plato, in whose tuning "inwards" (daimonion, "Divine spark") he justifiably senses a "betrayal of healthy instincts." Expressed in a nutshell, it is this new level of human awareness and existence, the existence in reflection, that is rejected by Nietzsche through this very same reflection, and that, as Kierkegaard already realized correctly, out of the despair of reason over itself--and yet, there is no turning back. While it is already paradoxical (and ungrateful) that reason wants to resign here, since and as far as it recognizes itself by means of reflection as reflection which can be rather attributed to a functional self-realization; therefore, on an existential level, there is even less of a turning back to(the times) before its resulting new, highest form of existence in "concentrated love": even this despair of reason over itself is still a very consequence of this love-- the consequence of an absolute awareness of this directedness that, however, does not want to let go of itself or release itself, even as reflection. Here, reason does at least not set itself as the condition and the condition of existing, however, as a means of the realization of this condition, which, turning backward, is supposed to be found in instinct, and thus there arises the paradox in Nietzsche's concept: this highest love it should be in the name of which the basest cruelties are, quasi out of necessity, demanded "by life itself" ... In reality, such a "love" is despair, a directly- proportional reversal of an initially positive directedness into its opposite in the face of the impossibility of the realization of the positive contents, un-fulfillable at least then when reason wants to hold on to itself--the case of the disappointed lover at the level of reason. No, with such "love", no turn of times wants to associate itself, the teaching of the anti-Christ Zarathustra is not a moving upward of the categories in inner logical consequence and necessity that elevates the viewpoint of existence, but a forced and violent regression of reason back into a state before its existence. Even Zarathustra still differentiates between good and evil, between decadence and health--even that is still morality, an instinct morality of opposites in the service of which reason is supposed to judge on the merit or non-merit of existence.

One might ask why, in this context, Nietzsche is chosen as the topic; this is based on several factors: at first, he appears to be the last who can, from a philosophical aspect, set the mind of him who deals with him into motion, for his powerful language of "unmasking psychology" forces one into the passionate concentration of one's own introspective-- the satiety and self-satisfaction of emotion, understanding and reason are unmasked as an unsupportable swamp, the successful pulling-out of which requires harshness against oneself (and not against others!) Insofar, he follows the path of reflection of reason once again and with the new means of our times (namely, by means of an "unmasking psychology"), as this path had to be walked in empirical and in existential manner in ancient Greek times by Socrates, up to Jesus: Nietzsche accomplishes this (next to others, as for example Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, and Freud) part of this path of reflection by means of reason in teaching reason's pathos to learn to understand itself. His putting himself into opposition to Socrates, Plato and Jesus is the prime example of an erroneous consequence (and, with this, still an example of grandiose consequence!) in the face of which the demonic nature of such an erroneous "turning back" in philosophy becomes apparent (half a century before, it became Germany's fate to undertake this in reality...): "love" as concentrated passion is used and wasted on a goal that lies below its own category.

Two outer occasions makes (made) the topic Nietzsche relevant (in 1988): this is (was) the anniversary of the first terrible outbreak of this demon, euphemistically referred to as Reichskristallnacht--the hatred, the selfishness and the lust for revenge in its most perverted form as "love of nation and fatherland", as myth of blood and soil in the service of racial hygiene and purity; and in this, the responsible regime could surely refer to Nietzsche, even if this was based on a one-sided "exegesis"--since Nietzsche already spoke out against anti-semitism when one still, as for example also Wagner, considered it to be a "patriotic virtue". One the other hand, out of the possibility of such an abuse arises Nietzsche's being declared a non-person, and his banishment into the poison cabinet of the former GDR, or the Nietzsche criticism by Otto Flake in the post-war era, become quite understandable. A further reason for choosing this topic is the circumstance that, around this time, Nietzsche's "passing the rubico" "celebrates" its 100th anniversary, the Turin "demise" of Zarathustra...the dissolution of his mind, was it really that fatigue that caught up with happiness?--see KGA III 3, p. 353). What conclusion, with respect to the function of mind, on the one hand as regards Nietzsche's case in particular, and, on the other hand, to a higher degree in general, does this allow for the amost terrifying contrast, when one contrasts this flame-and lightning-throwing fighter for a dionysic life who aims at splitting time and world into two halves as he speaks out of his last-published works, with his personal notes that he, for good reason, committed to paper twice and which, in their crude one- sidedness, even found their way into his work?

"Wasser trinken. (Drink water)
Nie spirituosa. (never liquor)
Morgens ein Glas Thee: kalt werden lassen!
(In the morning, a glass of tee: let it get cold)
nachts etwas wärmer! (at night, slightly warmer!)
nicht Brille auf Straße (no glasses on the street)
nicht in die Menge gehn! (do not mingle with the crowds!)
keine Briefe schreiben (no letter-writing)
Abends warme Kleider!" (In the evening warm clothes!) (KGA VIII 3, S. 386) (KGA VIII 3, p. 386)?

Does not such a small-minded self-observation and obviously necessary self-instruction appear paradoxical and comical in a "world-governing mind"? Is this mind not already split? In this, the proportion or share that the illness has on the one hand, the functional constant burden of the compulsion of thinking on the other hand, as well as complete isolation, remains to be seen -- ultimately, it might have been a combination of all three factors at the end of a path, at the walls of a cul-de-sac, from which there was no escape and no climbing over such a wall, anymore. Due to this, there might have been rpevailing in the year 1888 the fruitless inner rotation around the constantly announced "work of all works", the actual "re-evalauations"--to climb this wall and to actually become positive could, subjectively and objectively, not be reached along this path, since there was a lack of a binding-in of all that exists, and thus Nietzsche's last works, in which the actual "re-evaluation" fell apart, again only turned into attacks on the existing. The "sweet fruits of that autum": Götzendämmerung, Der Fall Wagner, Ecce homo, the Anti-Christ, what are these witness to? Certainly to a rarely reached mastery of style, in the polemic style--thus in "making war", and this is, after all, the intention of all of these works. However, war is not the father of all things; rather, such a revolution eats its children, when existence is split into a crass set of opposite forces instead of being bound in an upward and thus elevating direction. The essence of existence is not taken hold of in a creative manner and created anew in its being taken hold of--and yet, this is the only path of all creative elevation of life as a concentrated and directed and with this truly loving embrace of all that exists: along these lines a Socrates, a Plato and ultimately a Jesus created new realities of life as these had not been in the world, before. Our generations, however, are those of the path of reflection that uncovers the conditions and effects of that creation--and with this, it has, for the time being, been relieved of its content... This once so lively highest thought that created the high forms of religion with a strength that lasted 2,000 years and that is still present in the categories of understanding an reason today, this thought is turning into an empty concept for us due to the fact that we, with the coldness of reflection, drain the life blood out of it: we erroneously trace this thought back to the conditioning and functionality of our reason, while this reason was, however, only a caretaker or custodian of images in the service of something else: the introspective of humans who, in their striving beyond themselves (transcendence) accept with and through culture the natural task of evolution.

The best description of a static world view might have been provided by Spinoza: "Unter Gott verstehe ich das absolute unendliche Sein, das heißt die Substanz, die aus unendlich vielen Attributen besteht, deren jegliches ewige und unendliche Wesenheit ausdrückt" (by "God", Spinoza meant the absolute infinite existence, that means the substance that consists of an infinite number of attributes each of which expresses the eternal and infinite essence--Ethik I, 6). Here, "God" is the all-encompassing, eternal and eternally constant "causa" (cause) including all "eternal attributes", and, with this, the static basis out of which all modes of the existing flow. Nietzsche contrasts this with his "Gott ist tot" (God is dead); with this he means, first of all, the Christian God; however, his attack reaches far beyound a merely superfical polemic against Christianity; even the concept of a Spinoza is meant to be toppled by it, every pre-stabilized and static concept of God is thrown aside in favor of a dynamic concept of God: that of the "super-human" (since, thought through in all of its consequences, this image of the "super-human" even contains the concept of the "super-super-human", etc.). Nietzsche thus receives that "God" that he refuted as creator at the outset (so-to-say 'in the background') back as "super-human" at the other end of the spectrum (so-to-say 'in the foreground'). Therefore, whether one pre-supposes "God" at the outset or at the other end of the spectrum, it is merely an indication of the different mode of thinking that is time and category-bound. In the first instance, this thinking is a statically-causal one, in the second instance, it is a dynamically-teleological one. Moreover: all those who pre-suppose "God" at the "outset", by whatever name, go out from (the concept of) eternity, from "existence" as such or per se, they see the reality of existence as an emanation, as the pouring-out of "God". Wherever God is pre-supposed at the other end of the spectrum (in the 'foreground'), one argues on the basis of "development"., the "progress" towards "God".

Therefore, when Nietzsche directs his attack here against the early Christians and in particular against St. Paul, he is confusing horse and rider, he does not know life, himself, he is lacking the basic realization of the necessity and function of even "resentment", since he, one-sidedly and in a crude manner, puts his stakes on the accellerating force as will for power (WzM--"Wille zur Macht"); all of his attacks against the weak, the all-too-many, the "Hinterweltler" (those who dwell in redundant realms), against equality, the infirm, the compassionionate, altogether: against decadence, are based on the same error, on a subjective resolution of wanting to see life being driven upward as unconstrainedly as possible: (towards) the "super-human" as a result of the "will for power". Without any insight into and consideration of the categoriality (and thus differentiality) amongst human beings, he considers himself who is certainly to be considered as belonging to the innovative branch of it, not as "pars" (part), but as "pro toto" (sum total); what he can observe on himself as an "innovative" force, he wants to crudely and forcibly extend to all of life: to refute the retarding decadence (that he also observes in himself), in order to "reach the super-human for a second". And for him, in this described confusion, Christianity becomes the main obstacle. So that he, himself, does not have to see and seek the possibility of decadence at the basis of life (which, as capability of reduction is certainly necessary in evolution as a survival strategy), he urgently needs someone who is responsible for this indisputable phenomenon within the "overall population" of humanity: St. Paul. By the away, it is this one-sidedness of the will for power that does not allow Nietzsche to arrive at the actual importance of this levelling. Towards the end of his life, this one-sidedness appears to turn into a raging against himself, he pulls the rug off beneath himself and loses his connection with life and reality. Precisely this aspect of his thinking is dangerous since it opens the gates to abuse (in providing for it an "ideal" basis) and not in sink with real life which combines both forces and is aimed at an inter-related consensus of the whole. The surplus force of life always remains aware of its origin and serves life as a whole. While those who have been equipped by nature in a certain way and thus have to classify themselves as belonging to the ascending trend will be tempted to display contempt for the regressive (and with this the conservative and the average), they should, however, always remain aware of the perspectivity that they need to distance and separate themselves from the retarding and regressive majority, and never elevate it to their (basic) principle.

Due to this reason, Nietzsche, at the end of the second half of the arc of metaphysic, has to turn Plato "upside down": where the true-beautiful has fallen off in art, its "actual" importance necessarily shifts to the artist and to the creative process by means of which the still entirely unknown and new "work of art" has to be brought forth. For, the formerly true has fallen off for Nietzsche, and that not only as a remnant of the past, as something outdated that would merely have to be replaced by a "newer" truth; rather, the true itself loses its value: due to the realization that, with this, reason itself sets itself as the actual standard of truth without being able to do so in reality. Rather, for Nietzsche, the function of reason as the standard of truth is replaced by art--due to which the essence of this "art" was, as the art work, to be entriely newly defined. Now, truth as the metaphysical abode of the true (="God") (with which man's reason is able to make contact) is no longer true, but rather only such artistry is true that creates the new in a process of development or becoming. The true world and the world of appearances and illusion, out of the realization of this duality of which the receiving thinking of reason is unfolding (both in ancient Greek thought and with Buddha)--this separation of the experiencing of the world that arises out of the difference beween the sensuality of understanding and the receiving and comparing of reason is, with Nietzsche, declared void in favor of the sensuality of immanence: with the true world there necessarily falls off also the world of appearances appearances and illusion, since this illusory nature was (allegedly) forced upon the visible, sensual world by this perspective of the "true world". Where this latter perspective is considered or recognized as an erroneous self-will of reason, there only remains the sensual world as the true. With this, the circle of metaphysic is closed in the process of reception and reflection of reason that ultimately refutes itself (as the beginning of this could already be observed in Schopenhauer) and arrives at its sensual point of departure and is only present, as perspective of reason, in a negative sense or manner; that it itself can neither be nor arrive at or determine the essentially true--and thus Nietzsche is of the opinion that he has to move "back" to the point in time before the point of departure of reason. For him, the proposal of the "true essence" lies "behind" things in arriving at a world perspective that prevents the necessary elevation of life; this elevation, however, is supposed to be the task of art. The standard and path of this "art" is supposed to elevate itself out of instinct and the sensual (in which he does not know how to differentiate between the basically and entirely different categories but rather throws them together in a mystifying manner.) It is obvious that this is a concept of art that is entirely different from that of Plato who separates art into "techne" and "to kalon". The right to even still speak of art, Nietzsche quasi sneaks in, and that from the point of view of that which all art esthetics up to now have requested of it (art), and that ever since Plato's days: that art should evoke eros in a stimulating (= elevating) manner--this assumed inner function of art is, however, the only connecting link, the essence of art and its "means" are conceptualized quite differently. However, even this "last, very essence" of art, this "stimulating inner function", has to be refuted. For this, art as art is too limited; rather, it borrows the flame of eros from man's introspective, its actual burning that was once at home in the religious realm and that can neither be found in the ethical nor in the ideal. In other words: elevation in art is present there where introspective and reason are combined in man's neural brain networking either partially or totally at the existential level; then, art is able to move--however, we are, at least phylogenetically, no longer at this point today. While Plato, in the reception of reason, moves away from sensual life towards the metaphysical "being" of ideas, Nietzsche wants to return to the category of understanding of conscious appearance--in the assumption to be "closer" to "true life" in this way. However, is that true? And when would art ever have had such a role, function or task that is ascribed to it here: to save mankind from pessimism, to bring it alive by emphazising its maliciousness? Has not art, so far, never been cause but consequence, and so far, it has never ruled, itself, but rather, has always stood in the service of something else, i.e. power respectively religion. Therefore, art has always been a sign or indication that, by seizing the world, a gain has been made-- art presupposes the awareness of abundance but it does not create it! For Nietzsche, however, art is supposed to take the place of the "dead God" as the highest appearance of the will for power, by the appearance of which shall be accomplished the firing-on of mankind towards the development of the "super-human". In this, neither Nietzsche nor Heidegger ask as to how the essence of such art is supposed to be conceptualized respectively how such "works of art" are supposed to be created or what these are supposed to be like in order for them to be able to have such an effect. One thing is certain: the conventional concept of art and works of art is blown to pieces. Therefore, behind this "new concept of art" is hiding something different--with it, Nietzsche is returning to cult, back to the Dionysos cult (out of which, with the ancient Greeks, art once emerged!). This "art" has to, if it wants to replace the "dead God" and with it actually religion, become religion, itself. At this point, Heidegger is suffering from the same misconception as Nietzsche: to pre-suppose or declare the "dead God" a God of morality so that, for both of them, this would mean that they are "only" dealing with a change of perspective between the categories of understanding and reason, whereby the abstract essence of reason is discarded in favor of the "reality of life" of sensuality--instead of considering that morality has only assumed the appearance of the religious, that the actual fact, however, is the "death" of the sacred God! It is this "artful misconception" that makes the supposed replacement of morality of art possible. Of course does the appearance of the sensual allow for a more colorful world than the actual emptiness of a "reasonable" morality-- that, however, is not the issue: the actual "loss of the center" is the severing of the connection to the sacred. What is missing is an understanding of how and that religion, morality and art are interdependent within one category, here that of reason and develop ouf of one and the same root, namely out of a categorical elevation and accelleration in comparison to a previous stage of networking of the human brain. Therefore, it is not appropriate to throw religion and morality overboard as errors in order to retain art as the only salvation: This does not actually happen with Nietzsche without his making this clear to himself and to us, since "his" art that is supposed to create the "new true" in its opting for existential appearances as will for power, is no longer art in a traditional sense, and insofar, Nietzsche still or already belongs to those who, in reality, discard the 2000-year-old concept of art. This concept aimed--by combining rules (techne) with the "beautiful" (to kalon--an esthetic that has been comprised of and arrived at by reflection) towards a "higher"=ideal "truth"= harmony with and in existence. All these traditional concepts, in the de-velopment and differentitation of reason, are discarded by Nietzsche, mind is taken out of the concept of art in a regression to the "biological" and thus de-spiritualized. Carefully considered, life is equated with art here, and that not even in all of its forms of existence and appearance, but with the exclusion of precisely that developmental level (reason), that actual art owes its existence to. Art as the process of creation is identified with that which here is termed introspective--this, however, is a turning back to instinct and the sensually-intoxicated by means of which "life", incarnating itself as the will for power, is supposed to create the "true" as "beautiful appearance". Here, too, can again be observed the closing of the circle of metaphysic, related to art: at the end of its own unfolding, art dicards itself which, of course, finds its source in the fact that reason discards itself without realizing this self-contradiction: reason and with it also art of this category have arrived at the end of the circle they were able to pass though, they are tired of the process of reflection, and thus, with Nietzsche, they return to their own origin: to the sensual, the intoxicating, the instinctive.

Even if this turning back is nonsense, and also desperate (ultimately, that is the actual pathos of Nietzsche: a desperate introspective), this attack on and toppling of the concept of art was also still necessary, for in art, ever since enlightenment, the last retreat of introspective within reason has been sought and found in romanticism, up to the mystification by Schopenhauer. Art was the last retreat and hold for a reason that identified itself with intropspective after religion and morality have (supposedly) been defamed and emptied out as man-made. With the loss of this last hold, reason confronted its own nakedness, it (and after all, again reason) needed new clothes: Nietzsche, as a child of the 19th century, still holds on to the concept of "art", yet, what he means by it, is already something quite different: this new and different "art" is what is supposed to give birth to a new morality and religion. Under the guise of art, he is searching for a new beginning, since he desperately realizes in himself and in his times that man is lacking "something": the lively connection to his own introspective that can no longer be established under the old concepts of religion, morality and art. Nietzsche owes his holding on to the concept of art to his erroneous concept of the ancient Greeks in whose manner of reaching further he still senses an "original art"-- without, firstly, realizing that even still his own thinking is based on this very manner as moving in an arc; yet, above all, in his non-realization of the fact that with the ancient Greeks, art was as little original within the meaning of causally-conditioning as anywhere else: art is always a consequential phenomenon, an outpouring of a new capability that hearkens back to something else, namely to a categorical elevation that brings to humans a new awareness of the world and thereby endow's man's creative will with a new quality. And with the ancient Greeks, this altered creative will can, however, not be reduced to and as art; rather, as in philosophy, religion and morality, the quality also changes in art--and in all three, as a consequence of this categorigal change. Due to this reason it is impossible for Nietzsche to render a definition of "his" art, for, in order for him to be able to do so, this categorical change of perspective should already have occurred, in search of which, however, Nietzsche still is, and that in the wrong direction. His demand on art for "creation" in the sense of a real-existential elevation of the existing is directed at the wrong address; also, he, himself, is not that "super-human" who could realize this new perspective--and due to this he has no idea what such an "art of the future" should look or be like except the merely negative (idea) that it could not be what has heretofore been known as art. However, his "functional" rendering of a concrete concept of art, namely: that this "art" pre-supposes the vilifaction of man and the dionysian intoxication (what Heidegger "benevolently" and redefiningly weakens and describes in analogies, where Nietzsche is precisely aiming at its triumphant strength), all this we might take as a "given": nothing that, heretofore, has been called art, has to do with it, so why should it, in the future? In reality, Nietzsche is not even talking about art, rather, he brings nature and life itself into the perspective of the artist as creator--however, in this he takes that which can only be an image as the thing itself. This is based--in spite of all of his despising of reason and its alleged methods of determining the truth-- in reason's holding on to itself: for even this elevating art has been, ever since the times of the ancient Greeks, a "product" of this categorial elevation towards this reason. While it, superficially, lets go of itself "with itself", and while it disrobes art of all former content and form, it, in reducing the "art of the future" to the plainly "higher" in form of appearance, which, through existence, is supposed to transfer into truth, this "higher" still belongs to its own mode of realization, as it is, on the other hand, also still reason itself that speaks and realizes here: and which means to be able to anticipate the unfolding of existence into the existing! Besides the non-sensical turning back to the state of intoxication and to vilification, this is the most objectionable in Nietzsche: that it is always still his reason that proudly relies on itself and that is lacking all humility: for this artist who is creating the new appearance that is spposed to transform itself into the new truth, this creative artist, he would dearly with to be himself! And this view of art allows him to finally elevate himself above the life-long thorn in his flesh, Richard Wagner, for this would be the highest form of creation: to not "only" bring forth a work, and be it the "total work of art", but to re-model and re-shape life itself. What a delusion of grandeur...

In this crude vision, the overlooking of the numinous or sacred and vilification are closely interrelated: for, if the sacred also holds the meaning of unification, and that also with the "numinous object" (="God") as also within and with all the existing, then the essence of vilification is the opposite--here, life, and that again by means of reason, is split into "right" and "wrong" in which that vilification is to serve in driving out the allegedly wrong with brutal force. In this, however, Nietzsche ascribes to "life" his view of it, the manner in which he wishes that life should be, and does not realize how life actually works: it does not really push the "weak" into the abyss, as Nietzsche's outrageous non-ethic demands. When man does evil to his fellow man, then, this is not "life", but rather "homo hominis lupus" where man puts his mind into the service of lower categories and thus against life. Life itself finds quite different ways here, it constantly creates new forms on a basis that is being preserved, nothing old has to go under, since life always creates a delicate balance of all that it created and creates, as far as there is room for it. Only those mixed forms of existence that have proven themselves as useless and that do not belong to the great line of ascendance of life (and its inter- relatedness) are allowed to be put aside--however, this is an "innocent" decay of the redundant in place of which something new arises: a synergic effect of the total organism of earth, not, however, the dominance of one species over another. This latter behavior is only found in man and his reason, and in this he (still) finds himself in opposition to life--and that mainly always then when he uses this reason for sub-categorical purposes. Life "sanctifies" itself in its own elevation and accelleration by its phylogenetic top's constantly striving towards further enlivening and inter-connection up to the awareness and consciousness of man who can recognize this striving with that awareness and consciousness--or who can, like Nietzsche, look away and turn back in order to serve old categories as vilified lupus. To then even find the "future work of art" in this transforming vilification is preposterous: this creative elevating activity that we call art has never developed out of a vilification of man, but always as a prelude or as a consequence of the sacred or numinous: with and as its reception and reflection in the respective category--art never was and never will be a "coarsening", rather and to the contrary, always "refinement".

Life or mother nature (in Heidegger's terms: the existing as a whole) would, indeed, not be in need of any defense; Nietzsche, however, with his concept of its thrust, ascribes to it a "mode of behavior" that, in reality, is based on an erroneous evaluation of allegedly objective observations. True: we see the extinction of species (even without human intervention), we see the competition of species and the food chains amongst them, we see the essence of selection,--however, neither on the basis of "inter-related chains" nor on that of the selective accelleration of the existing can any kind of "will" be interpreted into nature that would aim at sacrificing the weaker to the stronger, and that even "with pleasure!" Rather, nature always strives for a delicate balance, and the stongest is always in need of the weakest as a basis. Nature is never (based on) a process of separating and juxtapositioning (of forces), but a synergic weaving of inter-relationships, in whose web everything is equally necessary. The pushing or casting-aside of species then belongs as much to creation as, on the other hand, the respective food chains (within which also we still find ourselves as benefactors), are nothing but receiving, inter-related chains of the existing. Here, one might want to argue and intervene by asking what meaning should be ascribed to nature's own grand-scale destruction(s), such as, for example, the extinction of the dinosaurs and similar catastrophes? While these phenomena have, even today, not been entirely understood with respect to their causes and with respect to their entire sequences, one might be able to say this much: such global events are always based on a change in the synergy of the entire solar system, which earth and the conditions prevailing on it are depending on as a partial system. And even in this entire system prevails a delicate balance that can be thrown off its course by "earth-made" disturbances or by changing constellations, and that from an anorganic basis: it is, after all, still the by far older structure of inter-relationships of the existing as is that of living organisms, and it can have a devastating effect on these living organisms. To judge this irrevocability of the dependence on the anorganic basis from a moral viewpoint or to ascribe it to a God, respectively to read into it a will of nature to thrust or push is still less applicable as to organic life, inasmuch as we still find ourselves even one step back in the inter-relationships of the existing, inter-relationships that, the further these are categorically removed from each other, the less should they be paralleled, as they, in their accellerating development, change their quality.

That Nietzsche only practices his non-ethics in his work--and that mainly with the "super-human" in mind, thus a remote "type"--however, he explicitly recommends this vilification for present humans as the path to the "super-human"--that honors him, on the one hand, as far as this position of his does not enter into his real life. However, at the same time, this is a very questionable gap: how can, in his work, something be demanded, and even if it is only of future human beings, that one can not and does not want to fulfill in one's own real life? Should he not, rather, have found his own morality (and even more its conditioning he was not conscious of) questionable instead of even explicitly emphasizing his own morality-conscious conduct?

The real "emphasis" of life is, after all, of quite a different kind than that which Niezsche thinks up in his "Ewige Wiederkunft des Gleichen" (eternal recurrence of the same--EWdGl): for, it binds the inner working(s) of all that exists from the very bottom and its beginnings up to us in our times, as we, ourselves, can become aware of this driving agent or force in ourselves. Contrary to this, the mode of thinking of which Nietzsche wants to convince us, is merely contrived: that, considering finite force and infinite time, all that exists has already existed once and will also recur or re-appear in the same form. The inevitablility contained therein of the existing in existence (amongst other considerations also a kind of predestination) rejects any kind of free reason. So far, neither the "sacred or numinous" has been found by contriving it (the greatest emphasis that, according to Nietzsche, is supposed to lie in the EWdGL, is identical with the sacred or numinous as the link beyond oneself), nor has, so far, the "greatest emphasis" found itself in such a rejected relationship to man's mode of thinking: it had to be able to be combined with the respective category-- or it fell off as heresy. After all, it is the respective elevation of a category that is the pre-condition for a new view of transcendence (however, this elevation does not "produce" it!), and thus there can (at first) not be a contradiction between the "sacred or numinous" and the category of ratio. Moreover: never was the "greatest emphasis" in need of being proven--as Nietzsche does it; proof by means of "ratio" (see also "evidences" for the existence of God and their refutation from St. Augustine to Kant) has always been an argument against it.

On the other hand, and, at that, self-derived, Heidedder is right in interpreting respectively analogizing Nietzsche, namely when he is concerned with comparing Nietzsche's deepest and most remote thoughts, whenever they allow themselves to be uncovered, with his own thoughts, in order to determine their place in his framework, since every thinker, if he wants to be one and should be one, has to pay attention to that in his framework-- how he develops his concept of existence and of the existing--all thoughts and concepts of other pre-thinkers and contemporary thinkers can and must be contained. It is justified to bring Nietzsche's concepts into his framework from this aspect, where these concepts are equivalent and identical concepts with different names or different terms. This would, then, be a kind of "de-subjectivizing" in order to arrive at the core of Nietzsche's concept as he, himself, was not able to concretely describe it. That this is often necessary arises out of Nietzsche's own overlooking of the question of that this "last" contemporary man actually is, thus, what mind is. Rather, he is only interested in the question of into what this "new man" is supposed to develop--again, however, without considering what also even with respect to this "super-human" has to be mind--and that precisely this mind still has to be and remain the basis of this "new human". From this viewpoint, Nietzsche is also still moral (=evaluating), only, he wants immorality as morality; this, however, is still morality as an "a priori" setting of values, since his "love" draws from the "rich well" of instincts and urges and sets with this another order against the existing one. He wants to tie his chaos fast "further down", where life as a creative force has already moved far beyond it--to cite Hegel here, fore once; "was wird, ist (auch) vernünftig" (that which is becoming is (also) reasonable) (namely through the very fact of its becoming what it is and by not becoming anything else), and Nietzsche is unreasonable: he sees only that man, as something existing, in his perception, is "sincerely bad"--and due to this he splits up the concept of mind in a crude manner: reason (mind="ratio") must be relieved of or saved from an erroneous setting of values (=the end of metaphysic), the leading place should be given to the "sacred" play (=dionysian "art") of instinct (instinct="mind"). Here, Heidegger, as the more "reasonable" thinker can not follow (him), he experienced this in his own times and in his own being misled and in his own terrible experience, as to what effects such a putting of reason on the "back burner" in favor of living out instincts in reality (as that of the "Third Reich") may have--which did, however, not lead him to principally and actively-openly swear off this national-newly-creating myth of power and force which he, still in his "Directoratsrede" (directorate speech) deemed to see as uprising in Naziism; however, reality opened his eyes to the crudeness of this turning back so that, from there, he was only left with the choice to escape into the philosophically-mystical. Ultimately, Heidegger, different from Nietzsche, gives credence to truth as being in first rank in the face of such an "art"...--his "higher" identifies itself precisely as such in that it encompasses all that exists as its own basis and in elevating all existence through itself.

Let us try to combine Nietzsche's main concepts and ideas such as EWdGl (the eternal recurrence of the same), WzM (the will for power), and the "super- human", into one image; the super-human is the goal towards which the WzM works in the "last human", it is this super-human that the last human must wish for at the moment of the EWdGl, which means that he accepts it and lets his existence be guided fron then on by this "moment of the eternal": each moment of it directed towards this EWdGl and its goal of the "super-human", which existence, out of this directedness wishes for its own demise. WzM and EWdGl become identical respectively interchangeable insofar as the actual aim of EWdGl is this choice for the elevation of life, as much as, in turn, this WzM accepts and confirms the EWdGl precisely in the self- negation of the existing for the sake of the elevation of the existing, since it, in the cycle of existence, recurs eternally--this eternity can, in the WzM as an elevating cycle, only want itself. With this view, Nietzsche is, indeed, already positively objectivized-- he, himself, generally prefers to express himself more concretely, more positivistically and harder, with cruelty against the existing; that, however, are also living human beings who have to be "discarded" for the sake and in the name of the super-human, towards which one should also still actively push them--for Zarathustra, this is a hard toad to swallow; he swallows it, nevertheless...In spite of this well-meaning analogizing we have to ask, is this viewpopint actually true? The overall interpreation of existence as WzM in combination with its EWdGl? And, how does Nietzsche actually conceptualize the super-human, this alleged next incarnation of the WzM in the existing? What expectation can we, out of all previous experience, with respect to the nature of the existing, nurture? This "super-human" is, for us as "last humans", of course, what comes first to mind, since we, ourselves, are supposed to be the ones who would have to work towards him and towards our own demise: this overcoming of ourselves be our existential task, supported by the thought of the EWdGl as emphasis and in the realization that existence as a whole is WzM. However, when we look at all emanations of the existing, we know that:

a) the innovation beyond the previous species, albeit being individually conditioned;--that, however, out of such innovation (if it really is an innovation, meaning that with it, the emergence of a new species occurs) a new population must emerge that includes itself into a similar, if not even higher gradation, as we can already observe this in us, the "last humans". The "super-human" would, within its own species, also be categorically divided five-fold as man is, since he, too, would still be subjected to the same natural properties, qualities and inclinations and their different forms in the individuals. For, as much as humans cannot be thought (of) and understood without their basis of the primates as their ancestors as well as without the basis of the entire chain oflife, as much would man, in the form of the "last human", form the departing structure of the new that is supposed to arise by means and out of (cerebral) innovation to form the "super-human".

b) these changes through and into the direction of the accelleration will no longer have anything to do with the phenotype directly, but rather would aim at the degree of consciousness/awareness by simultaneously holding on to the phenotype. From a phenotypical viewpoint, we "last humans" would not be able to recognize the type of the super-human, at all, but rather would consider him one of us. The best proof for this at first unproven statement is man in his form of homo sapiens sapiens himself: who, in spite of all of his own innovations (above all, that of the development from the category of understanding to the category of reason) has not changed phenotypically.

Nietzsche's super-human would, therefore--to connect him with the thoughts still to be presented here--ultimately be the equivalent of a part of man's population, in whose species a further category would, neurally and existentially be realized. When Nietzsche is of the opinion that "last man" must, necessarily, go under due to this, he errs with respect to the very process of life itself: as little as innovation into the direction of reason prevents the constant emergence of the "categorical" type of understanding within the human population and inasmuch as this category is represented in "nice" regularity and is even in the majority, as much is and remains the "last man" in the form and differentiation of the category of reason the basis of the super-human. This view appears convincing insofars as we, if we even want to make a statement with respect to an accelleration and elevation (and that is, after all, what the "super-human" stands for), we have to remain within that framework of nature's (and culture's) mode of behavior as we find it leading up to us and including ourselves, which model(s) of behavior brought us forth and forward and which we, ultimately, also condition-- otherwise, we would catapult our (alleged) "looking ahead" so far into the "future" that, in reality, nothing more could be understood by the term "super-human" but rather, it would then stand for a mystical or mythical inter-relationship. Such an interpretation of the concept of the super-human will be mystical only then when, in reality, nothing concrete is supposed to be said with respect to it, when a reference is supposed to be made to something that we "last humans" can actually not fathom. Then, however, there only occurs an exchange of concepts by means of which the open that lies in the dark, namely that empty spot, is supposed to be covered that, in earlier times, was occupied by "God", whereby the concept of "God" is dynamically charged. The concept is rather more mythically occupied when, under its guise, a "real turning back" to an alleged "natural health" is to be understood by it, such as the Dionysian chaos: behind it is hiding only reflection's growing tired of itself, that this cutting itself loose from itself with itself, in order to allegedly "newly" form man in a past, on the basis of something else. Nietzsche's interpretation of the super-human swings back and forth between the possibilities of myth and the mystical, and that always depending on whether he argues from the side of his "ratio" or from his existentiality; is it then, however, right to alalogize this philosophy of the super-human as far as it was, above, connected with a "third category"? Heidegger's interpretation of the super-human is exclusively mystical, insofar as he identifies him with the overcoming of the cycle of metaphysic, with a new foundation of existence as a whole through a new manner of existence in time, which is supposed to be achieved by a change of consciousness of man, towards the super-human: a new uncovering of the "aletheia". Such an emptying-out that is turning towards and into the mystical acts against the prohibition of analogizing, when Nietzsche actually speaks much more concretely and when he explicitly and in no manner wants to be misunderstood: his super-human is not to be understood as rationally unfathomable mysticism, but as a myth of creation by means of art.

Existence as a Whole and EWdGl

The existence of the existing must be included in the existence of the whole, otherwise, the first would not have been able to unfold out of the latter; and the determination of existence as a whole as well as the existence of the existing can only be derived out of an inter-relationship, going out from the existence of the existing: wherefrom and what would one have, otherwise, wanted to carry over into existence, what would have, at first, to be experienced in the existence of the existing? Principally, with respect to Heidegger's viewpoint, one has to consider how much this construction of existence as a whole, the existence of the existing as well as that of the existing itself is akin to the thinking of Spinoza: as a further abstraction from the existing towards the essence, towards the "essence" of essence--what, ultimately, appears as a mechanical and baseless extension of an at first correct abstraction method via reflection.

The essence of existence as a whole must be the point of departure for all that exists, as much as all hitherto apparent essence of the existence must be able to be found again in existence; with this, however, it is said that the existence of the whole is not completed (because it is not completely unfolded) and that every statement with respect to existence is preliminary, hypothetical, since its essence will have to and can only be determined after a further unfolding (i.e. by that "super-human"). >From this viewpoint, the determination of the essence of existence as a whole as WzM (will for power) in the EWdGl (eternal recurrence of the same) is a presumption of the "last man" Nietzsche, and that, moreover, connected with an erroneous concept of the essence of the existing, through which, after all, the essence of existence as a whole is also conditioned; for, due to the fact that, with Nietzsche, the manner of the existing as it can alone be accellerated, is not conceptualized along this way, but only raised in form of the demand for an accelleration by means of the "new art" on the basis of the Dionysian play of instincts, he is cutting himself loose from the observable facts of life and arrives in a mythical-mystical nowhere. Rather than that, the actual manner in which the existing is accellerated belongs indissolubly to the essence of the existing (and, with this, also to the essence of existence as a whole), since it is the path of the existing from the deeper to the higher; this path of its unfolding can, however, not be merely found in the existential resolution of the acceptance of the EWdGl, but it necessarily also needs a physical basis: in the EWdGl, Nietzsche "only" makes provision for the spiritual act of the changeover in the individual--which act is, by the way, the more difficult problem; he does, however, not provide for any well-founded concept of the essence of the existing and its manner, as to how this existing, in its functional being-so can be put into a position, in the first place, to find itself (ready) for this step. However, it is not enough to only see the task of overcoming nihilism; rather, one has to, as Nietzsche knows, have existentially gone through it. The preconditions for this, however, neural development and existential reflection, their essence and function, nowhere does Nietzsche provide for those or indicate them--even if he is aware of the fact that he is missing something here; not without reason did he want to, at first, still study natural sciences for ten years. For the essence of the super- human, the conceived distance between him and the "last" = today's man, is of the essence: Zarathustra/Nietzsche as teacher of the EWdGl blesses his own demise (and not only his ...) in the awareness, that he, himself, is still a preliminary stage and thus not super-human, yet. The relationship between man and super- human is, rather, determined in the same manner as the relationship between ape and man--a kind of laughing stock is what man shall be to the super-human. >From that kind of a distance, the essence of the super-human becomes as much invisible to the "last man" Nietzsche as for the preliminary stage member Zarathustra: as little as the ape cannot understand the essence of man, as little will man be able to understand it with respect to the super-human. The gap between one species and the next-higher species is not the smallest, but as an unbridgeable one, one that is removed the furthest. Moreover, in the face of such a distance, the statement "auf eine Sekunde den Übermenschen erreichen" (to reach the super-human for a second) becomes an entirely false one, it is a similar confusion as if an ape would consider a Neanderthal a member of his species. And in reality, Nietzsche means something quite different here: the moment of the thought of the EWdGl! For, if one looks at his existence as a whole of life and creativity, then this was certainly not shaped by one single determining leap; rather did he, too, still find himself confronted by the mere possibility that this thought or concept would be and must be taken for the truth--and this experience of the moment of the acceptance of the EWdGl ist Nietzsche's "sacred moment", the late consequence of which (that cannot be conceptualized by reason) should then become the super-human.

If the distance between man and super-human is set at the ratio of the distance between ape and man, the inevitable consequence of this is that by this emergence of the super-human, the essence of existence as a whole is transformed twofold: existence as a whole as well as its essence become different, since now, there is something new, particularly qualitatively completely new in it, due to which value and essence of existence as a whole have to be newly determined from this higher level-- as much as man finds the essence and the "meaning" of existence, overall, in something different as, for example, the ape. This is especially applicable for the WzM as a Dionysian chaos of instinct that Nietzsche pre-supposed of existence as a whole: the quality of this WzM has to differentiate itself as much from that of man as that between ape and man. Consequently, existence as a whole and its essence can, in no way, be seen or even determined from the viewpoint of this redundant "old form" man-- and it is precisely this that Nietzsche wants to achieve with the WzM in the EWdGl! With this, however, he allows himself an as ridiculous presumption as if the ape wanted to dictate to us in what we should see the meaning of the world. Here, too, does Nieztsche's existentiality confuse and mix up the distances: he thinks that he has to say something about this super-human, since this concept would, otherwise, remain completely mystical and rationally entirely empty (and with respect to which he could only have remained silent!)--and thus he applies himself to the essence of this alleged super-human in such a manner that he interprets his own being moved by his thinking and by his "accepting the truth" of the EWdGL as a "contact to the super-human", in which he, in a kind of "premonition" might consider himself as having turned into him. Instead of realizing that here, he was only in contact with himself, with his own self that wants to grow beyond itself! While, with this, he has experienced one of the highest levels of existence as "last man"--he is, on the basis of it, in no way super-human.

Translation by Ingrid Sabharwal-Schwaegermann http://www.geocities.com/vienna/strasse/3732/index.html
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